Population Policy through Tradable Procreation Rights

Tradable permits are now widely used to control pollution. We investigate the implications of setting up such a system in another field -- population control --, either domestically or at the global level. We first generalize the framework with both tradable procreation allowances and tradable procreation exemptions, in order to tackle both over- and under-population problems. The implications of procreation rights for income inequality and education are contrasted. With procreation exemptions or procreation allowances that would be expensive enough, resources are redistributed from the rich to the poor. In contrast, cheap procreation allowances redistribute resource towards the rich. As far as human capital is concerned, natalist policy would be bad for education, while population control would be good. If procreation rights are granted in proportion to existing fertility levels (grandfathering) instead of being allocated uniformly, population control can be made more redistributive. On the whole, procreation rights offer an interesting alternative to both coercive population control in developing countries and pronatalist policies in the developed world