Poltically credible taxation
We consider an environment in which a government implements a sequence of tax mechanisms that assign allocations to a population of privately informed agents. These mechanisms are determined by a process of electoral competition with agents voting over political candidate-mechanism pairs in each period. This arrangement precludes government commitment. Although, the t-th period mechanism plays an essential role in the provision of incentives for agents in periods prior to t, voters ignore this past benefit when they vote in the t-th period election. However, the outcome of a given mechanism depends both on the mechanism itself and agents behavior which, in turn depends on agents beliefs about future mechanisms. These beliefs can underpin trigger strategies that discipline the electoral process. We characterize the set of politically credible allocations and tax mechanisms in this setting and link their properties to the details of the electoral process
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||03 Dec 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed006:344. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.