A Matching Model of the Housing Market: Searching for a Motivated Partner
We construct a bilateral search model of the housing market in which agents differ in their flow rewards while searching. Buyers and sellers enter the market with high flow rewards, but move at a Poisson rate to a state with low flow rewards if they do not transact in the meantime. We characterize the equilibrium steady state matching pattern and compare this to the constrained efficient matching pattern. In particular we show that equilibrium is characterized by too little /Opportunistic Matching/, in which agents with high flow values will match only with agents with low flow values. We also characterize the joint distribution of price and time to sale (for sellers). The expected price conditional on time to sale falls with time spent on the market, while the conditional variance of price first rises and then falls with time on the market.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA|
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Antonio M. Merlo & François Ortalo-Magné, 2002.
"Bargaining over Residential Real Estate: Evidence from England,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
778, CESifo Group Munich.
- Merlo, Antonio & Ortalo-Magne, Francois, 2004. "Bargaining over residential real estate: evidence from England," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 192-216, September.
- François Ortalo-Magné & Antonio Merlo, 2002. "Bargaining over Residential Real Estate: Evidence from England," Wisconsin-Madison CULER working papers 02-02, University of Wisconsin Center for Urban Land Economic Research.
- Michel Glower & Donald R. Haurin & Patric H. Hendershott, 1998. "Selling Time and Selling Price: The Influence of Seller Motivation," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 26(4), pages 719-740.
- Kenneth Burdett & Tara Vishwanath, 1988. "Declining Reservation Wages and Learning," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 655-665.
- Gerard J. van den Berg, 1990. "Nonstationarity in Job Search Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 255-277.
- Horowitz, Joel L, 1992. "The Role of the List Price in Housing Markets: Theory and an Econometric Model," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 7(2), pages 115-29, April-Jun.
- Wheaton, William C, 1990. "Vacancy, Search, and Prices in a Housing Market Matching Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1270-92, December.
- Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-46, July-Aug..
- Michael A. Arnold, 1999. "Search, Bargaining and Optimal Asking Prices," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 27(3), pages 453-481.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed004:797b. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.