Optimal vs. time-consistent tax cycles
How does the size of the transfer system evolve in the short and in the long run? We construct a model where taxation is distortionary because it discourages capital accumulation. We compare the Ramsey allocation with the time-consistent allocation. The latter can be interpreted as the outcome of a politico-economic mechanism. A general finding is that the lack of commitment induces too persistent redistribution relative to what would have been chosen by a utilitarian planner under commitment. Another finding is that the standard result that optimal taxes should be "smooth" (possibly, after a finite number of periods) is not robust, and that the commitment solution may exhibit cycles.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA|
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed004:47. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.