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Liquid Bundles

  • Emmanuel Farhi
  • Jean Tirole

Parties in financial markets, industries, compensation design or politics may negotiate on either a piecemeal or a bundled basis. Little is known about the desirability of bundling when values are common and/or information endogenous. The paper shows that bundling encourages information-equalizing investments, thereby facilitating trade. It accordingly revisits and qualifies existing knowledge on security design.

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Paper provided by Harvard University OpenScholar in its series Working Paper with number 70971.

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  1. Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, 2010. "Competitive Non-linear Pricing and Bundling," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 30-60.
  2. Spiegel, Matthew, 1998. "Stock Price Volatility in a Multiple Security Overlapping Generations Model," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 11(2), pages 419-47.
  3. Duffie, Darrell & Malamud, Semyon & Manso, Gustavo, 2014. "Information percolation in segmented markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 1-32.
  4. Giovanni Cespa, 2000. "Short-term investment and equilibrium multiplicity," Economics Working Papers 520, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jun 2002.
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  7. Steven Shavell, 1994. "Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 20-36, Spring.
  8. Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1991. "A Theory of Trading in Stock Index Futures," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(1), pages 17-51.
  9. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Eric S. Maskin, 1996. "A Walrasian Theory of Money and Barter," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(4), pages 955-1005.
  10. Armstrong, Mark, 2013. "A more general theory of commodity bundling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 448-472.
  11. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
  12. Braz Camargo & Kyungmin (Teddy) Kim & Benjamin Lester, 2013. "Subsidizing price discovery," Working Papers 13-20, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  13. Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad, 1992. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 566-78, June.
  14. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
  15. Guillaume Plantin, 2009. "Learning by Holding and Liquidity," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(1), pages 395-412.
  16. Bruno Biais & Thomas Mariotti, 2003. "Strategic Liquidity Supply and Security Design," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 445, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  17. Gorton, Gary & Pennacchi, George, 1990. " Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 49-71, March.
  18. Peter M. DeMarzo, 2005. "The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A Model of Informed Intermediation," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 18(1), pages 1-35.
  19. Peter DeMarzo & Darrell Duffie, 1999. "A Liquidity-Based Model of Security Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 65-100, January.
  20. Benjamin Lester & Andrew Postlewaite & Randall Wright, 2012. "Information, Liquidity, Asset Prices, and Monetary Policy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(3), pages 1209-1238.
  21. Nachman, David C & Noe, Thomas H, 1994. "Optimal Design of Securities under Asymmetric Information," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(1), pages 1-44.
  22. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-87, May.
  23. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. Jean Tirole, 2012. "Overcoming Adverse Selection: How Public Intervention Can Restore Market Functioning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 29-59, February.
  25. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  26. Dang, Tri Vi, 2008. "Bargaining with endogenous information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 339-354, May.
  27. Michael D. Whinston, 1989. "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," NBER Working Papers 2995, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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