Can Clientelistic Ties Be Broken? Evidence from an Urban Titling Program in Mexico

Clientelism is common in developing countries, and often detrimentally affects political accountability and public good provision. However, little is known about how clientelistic equilibria break down, particularly because reforms that could reduce voter dependence on incumbents for special favors may also cause voters to reward the reform?s architects. Exploiting Mexico?s federal structure and changes in incumbency over time, we separate these countervailing effects in the context of a federal land-titling program that reached nearly 2.16 million urban households over 35 years. We find that municipal incumbents, who were not responsible for the program?s implementation but often rely on weak property rights to enforce clientelistic exchanges, experience a large and persistent decrease in their vote share in electoral precincts where the program was implemented. The clientelistic capacity of future federal incumbents is diminished to a lesser degree. However, we show that this loss is more than compensated for by the lasting increase in the implementing federal incumbent?s vote share among the land titling program?s beneficiaries. Aligned municipal incumbents also successfully claim credit, receiving a smaller boost that partially offsets their loss of clientelistic capacity. These results thus demonstrate that major programmatic reforms can reduce clientelism while also rewarding incumbents for their policies while in office.