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Renegotiation Proof Equilibria in Continuous Time Games

Author

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  • James Bergin
  • Bentley MacLeod

Abstract

This paper develops a model of strategic behaviour in continuous time games of complete information. This model bridges the gap between the differential formulation of a continuous time game and the procedure of taking limits with respect to discrete time games. The model admits a large class of strategies. As a result, the set of equilibria is large -- roughly equal to the set given by the folk theorem. In addition, we define the concept of renegotiation proof equilibrium in this context and characterize the set of renegotiation proof equilibria of the game.

Suggested Citation

  • James Bergin & Bentley MacLeod, 1989. "Renegotiation Proof Equilibria in Continuous Time Games," Working Paper 753, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    • Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:753
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