Continuous Time Repeated Games of Complete Information
This paper provides a formulation of continuous time repeated games of complete information. A substantial part of the paper is concerned with the definition of a continuous time strategy and the association of outcomes to strategies. The set of equilibria relative to these strategies is characterized in the remainder of the paper.
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|Date of creation:||1987|
|Date of revision:|
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