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Is the Natural Rate of Unemployment Compatible with a Stable Rate of Inflation?

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  • Malcolm R. Gray
  • Richard G. Lipsey

Abstract

The Phelps-Friedman theory that the long-run Phillips curve is perfectly inelastic at the natural rate of unemployment has been criticized by Tobin (1972) and others. This paper accepts tentatively the Phelps-Friedman hypothesis and enquires into what follows from it. We do this because the debate on whether or not the hypothesis is correct, insufficient attention has been paid to the policy implications that follow, should it come to be accepted.

Suggested Citation

  • Malcolm R. Gray & Richard G. Lipsey, 1974. "Is the Natural Rate of Unemployment Compatible with a Stable Rate of Inflation?," Working Papers 147, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:147
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    References listed on IDEAS

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