IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/qed/wpaper/128.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Bayesian Estimation of Macro and Micro CES Production Functions

Author

Listed:
  • Hiroki Tsurumi
  • Yoshi Tsurumi

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Hiroki Tsurumi & Yoshi Tsurumi, 1973. "A Bayesian Estimation of Macro and Micro CES Production Functions," Working Papers 128, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:128
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Erkan YalÁin & Thomas I. Renstr–m, 2003. "Endogenous Firm Objectives," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(1), pages 67-94, January.
    2. Frank Milne, 1981. "The firm's objective function as a collective choice problem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 473-486, January.
    3. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 927-940.
    4. Dierker, Egbert & Grodal, Birgit, 1996. "Profit Maximization Mitigates Competition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(1), pages 139-160, January.
    5. Showalter, Dean M, 1995. "Oligopoly and Financial Structure: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 647-653, June.
    6. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    7. David Kelsey & Frank Milne, 2006. "Externalities, monopoly and the objective function of the firm," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(3), pages 565-589, November.
    8. Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, 2005. "Profit Sharing and the Role of Professional Partnerships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 120(1), pages 131-171.
    9. Michael L. Katz, 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 307-328, Autumn.
    10. Steven D. Sklivas, 1987. "The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 452-458, Autumn.
    11. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    12. Nabil Al-Najjar & Sandeep Baliga & David Besanko, 2005. "The Sunk Cost Bias and Managerial Pricing Practices," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000496, UCLA Department of Economics.
    13. Ireland, Norman J. & Stewart, Geoff, 1995. "On the Sale of Production Rights and Firm Organization," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 289-307, December.
    14. Sadanand, Asha B & Williamson, John M, 1991. "Equilibrium in a Stock Market Economy with Shareholder Voting," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(1), pages 1-35, February.
    15. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    16. Kelsey, David & Milne, Frank, 1996. "The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 229-245.
    17. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1996. "The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(4), pages 53-69, Winter.
    18. De Meza, D. & Lockwood, Ben, 1997. "Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? The Property Rights Theory of the Firm with Alternating - Offers Bargaining," Discussion Papers 9701, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
    19. repec:hrv:faseco:30728046 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Patrick Bolton & Chenggang Xu, 1999. "Ownership and Managerial Competition: Employee, Customer, and Outside Ownership," CID Working Papers 20, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    21. repec:rus:hseeco:72155 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Edward L. Glaeser, 2003. "Introduction to "The Governance of Not-for-Profit Organizations"," NBER Chapters,in: The Governance of Not-for-Profit Organizations, pages 1-44 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. Farrell, Joseph, 1985. "Owner-consumers and efficiency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 303-306.
    24. Becht, Marco & Bolton, Patrick & Roell, Ailsa, 2003. "Corporate governance and control," Handbook of the Economics of Finance,in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 1-109 Elsevier.
    25. Brander, James A. & Lewis, Tracy R., 1986. "Oligopoly and Financial Structure: The Limited Liability Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 956-970, December.
    26. Oscar N. Refsell, 1914. "The Farmers' Elevator Movement: II," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22, pages 969-969.
    27. Jean Tirole, 2006. "The Theory of Corporate Finance," Post-Print hal-00173191, HAL.
    28. Edward L. Glaeser, 2003. "The Governance of Not-for-Profit Organizations," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number glae03-1, January.
    29. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1999. "Corporate Governance and Competition," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 99-28, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    30. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-147, Supplemen.
    31. Roberts, John & Van den Steen, Eric, 2000. "Shareholder Interests, Human Capital Investment and Corporate Governance," Research Papers 1631, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    32. Milne, F, 1974. "Corporate Investment and Finance Theory in Competitive Equilibrium," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 50(132), pages 511-533, December.
    33. Oscar N. Refsell, 1914. "The Farmers' Elevator Movement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22, pages 872-872.
    34. Petra Geraats & Hans Haller, 1998. "Shareholders' choice," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 68(2), pages 111-135, June.
    35. repec:cep:stitep:292 is not listed on IDEAS
    36. Baye, Michael R & Crocker, Keith J & Ju, Jiandong, 1996. "Divisionalization, Franchising, and Divestiture Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 223-236, March.
    37. Peter M. DeMarzo, 1993. "Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 713-734.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:128. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Babcock) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/qedquca.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.