The 15-years-long emergency, the burial-of-the-dead conflict and the ultimatum game
The application of game theory and cognitive economy to analyze the problem of undesired location - The analysts of the processes of public bodies decision - taking have long been discussing on the establishment of proper strategies to manage "environmental conflicts" - above all the so-called problems of "undesired location" of public works and facilities - efficiently (i.e. on a short-period basis so as to grant decision and agreement stability) and fairly (the parties’ satisfaction is itself a further guarantee of decision and agreement stability). Each strategy, anyway, is still in progress, like a "universe to create and explore". Therefore, in this paper, we will focus on the analysis of the problem and provide as well some theoretical proposals to arrange "a new interpreting model of public bodies decision-taking processes" based on the achievements of two new subject-matters: evolutionary game theory and cognitive economy. Both sciences share their investigation field with law and economic science.
|Date of creation:||28 Aug 2008|
|Date of revision:||12 Sep 2008|
|Publication status:||Published in Notizie di Politeia. Rivista di etica e di scelte pubbliche 93.XXV(2009): pp. 96-118|
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