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Thomas S. Schelling: game theory and indirect communication

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  • Estrada, Fernando

Abstract

In their recent work Thomas S. Schelling (2007, 2010), reiterating original arguments about game theory and its applications to social sciences. In particular, game theory helps to explore situations in which agents make decisions interdependent (strategic communication). Schelling's originality is to extend economic theory to social sciences. When a player can anticipate the options and influence the decisions of others. The strategy, indirect communication plays a crucial role. To illustrate, we investigate how to perform the payoff matrix in cases of bribery and threat

Suggested Citation

  • Estrada, Fernando, 2010. "Thomas S. Schelling: game theory and indirect communication," MPRA Paper 34988, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2011.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:34988
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34988/1/MPRA_paper_34988.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social Science; Schelling; game theory; strategic communications; bribes; threats;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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