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Let's make the tax system more lovable


  • Paunić, Alida


Making the taxes acceptable to large number of people by allocating their obligation to the chosen project is the main subject of this paper. In this way a greater objectivity, transparency and local goals are set in according to the preferences of the tax contributors. State Investment office prevents the rule of invisible hand of market by allocation part of tax money to the less developed regions reducing difference between them.

Suggested Citation

  • Paunić, Alida, 2007. "Let's make the tax system more lovable," MPRA Paper 3151, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:3151

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
    2. Giancarlo Corsetti & Paolo Pesenti & Nouriel Roubini, 1998. "What Caused the Asian Currency and Financial Crisis? Part I: A Macroeconomic Overview," NBER Working Papers 6833, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Ben-Bassat, Avraham & Gottlieb, Daniel, 1992. "Optimal international reserves and sovereign risk," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3-4), pages 345-362, November.
    4. Dani Rodrik, 1997. "Has Globalization Gone Too Far?," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 57.
    5. Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, 1996. "Determinants and impact of sovereign credit ratings," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 37-53.
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    More about this item


    tax; principal agent problem; welfare;

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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