Об Одной Модели Перераспределения Ресурсов
[A Model of Resource Redistribution]
Consider an economy with n resources (goods) and m agents, and let initial resource allocation be given. We ask if it is possible to build a mutually beneficial bargaining sequence that approaches an optimal resource allocation even though a) only k ≤ n agents participates at each step of the bargaining sequence, and b) they use only information about participants of the exchange. We answer this question using a new concept of quasi - summator functions. In particular, the answer is positive if k > n and all agent utility functions are concave.
|Date of creation:||1970|
|Publication status:||Published in Economics and Mathematical Methods / Ekonomika i matematicheskie metody 4.6(1970): pp. 583-593|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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