Optimal Taxation in the Automation Era

This paper studies the optimal tax-and-transfer policy when automation raises productivity but displaces unskilled workers. Using a general equilibrium model calibrated to the U.S. economy, we compute the steady-state social welfare-maximizing rate of each of four tax instruments: capital income taxation, unskilled wage taxation, taxation on automation capital (i.e., a robot tax), and consumption taxation. Following an increase in the productivity of automation-related capital, the welfare-maximizing capital income tax rate and robot tax rate are zero, as their long-run investment distortions outweigh their redistributive social benefits. In the baseline simulation, aggregate welfare is maximized by cutting the unskilled wage tax rate and, especially, the consumption tax rate. However, when unskilled labor and automation-related capital are highly substitutable, the optimal consumption tax rate increases, and the additional government revenue is redistributed to displaced unskilled workers.