عدم تقارن اطلاعات و نظارت در بانکداری ایران[The Challenge of Information Asymmetry and Supervision in The Iranian Banking]

Information asymmetry is one of the fundamental issues affecting the efficiency and stability of banking systems. In the context of Iranian banking, asymmetric information between banks, regulators, and customers has given rise to challenges such as adverse selection, moral hazard, and weakened market discipline. Moreover, supervisory frameworks face structural and institutional limitations that reduce their effectiveness in addressing these problems. This paper examines the challenges of information asymmetry in banking, analyzes its specific manifestations in the Iranian banking system, and evaluates the adequacy of current supervisory mechanisms. The study argues that improving transparency, strengthening regulatory capacity, and adopting advanced risk-based supervision can mitigate the negative effects of information asymmetry. Enhancing clients’ information disclosure and regulatory oversight is therefore crucial for improving the performance, stability, and credibility of Iran’s banking sector in the face of domestic and global financial challenges.