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Lisszaboni kilátások

Author

Listed:
  • László Á. Kóczy

    () (Óbuda University)

Abstract

A Lisszaboni Szerződés módosítja az EU legfőbb döntéshozó szervében, a Miniszterek Tanácsában alkalmazott minősített többségi szavazás szabályait. A jelenleg érvényben levő mechanizmus az országoknak a politikai alkuk eredményeképpen a Nizzai Szerződésben rögzített súlya áll, ezek 2019-ben megszűnnek és szerepüket a népességi adatok veszik át. A változás célja, hogy a döntések könnyebbek, igazságosabbak legyenek, és mindez teljesüljön az unió összetételének jövőbeni változásai esetén is. Az új döntési mechanizmus nem érinti a tagállamokat egyformán. Dolgozatunkban az országok befolyását játékelméleti modell: hatalmi mértékek segítségével vizsgáljuk. Bár az Unió döntési képessége megnő, egyes országok sokat veszítenek befolyásukból. Hazánk is a vesztesek közé tartozik, befolyása 40%-kal csökken a reform, illetve a kedvezőtlen demográfiai folyamatok eredményeképpen.

Suggested Citation

  • László Á. Kóczy, 2010. "Lisszaboni kilátások," Working Paper Series 1014, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1014.rdf
    as

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    File URL: http://uni-obuda.hu/users/vecseya/RePEc/pkk/wpaper/1014.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464.
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:48:y:1954:i:03:p:787-792_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. František Turnovec, 2008. "National, Political and Institutional Influence in European Union Decision Making," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(2), pages 154-173, September.
    4. László Á. Kóczy, 2009. "Measuring voting power: The paradox of new members vs the null player axiom," Working Paper Series 0903, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
    5. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2004. "A Priori Voting Power: What Is It All About?," Political Studies Review, Political Studies Association, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23.
    6. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Designing the Voting System for the Council of the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 437-464, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kóczy Á., László & Biró, Péter & Sziklai, Balázs, 2012. "Választókörzetek igazságosan?
      [Fair apportionment of voting districts in Hungary]
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 1165-1186.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    súlyozott szavazás; Európai Unió; Miniszterek Tanácsa; Lisszaboni Szerződés; demográfia; hatalmi index;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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