Voting games with endogenously infeasible coalitions
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KeywordsBanzhaf index; Shapley-Shubik index; a priori voting power; rational players.;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-06-04 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2010-06-04 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2010-06-04 (Network Economics)
- NEP-POL-2010-06-04 (Positive Political Economics)
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