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How Behavioral Heterogeneity Shapes Institution Formation and Cooperation: The Case of Cost-Sharing Alliances

Author

Listed:
  • Andrej Angelovski
  • Irene Maria Buso
  • Daniela Di Cagno
  • Werner Gueth
  • Lorenzo Spadoni

Abstract

While endogenous institution formation and behavioral heterogeneity in public-good provision have received substantial attention, they have largely been studied separately. Yet, differences in cooperative attitudes may shape not only contributions but also in dividuals’ willingness to initiate or join cooperative institutions. We study behavioral heterogeneity in a two-stage public-good game, where participants sequentially decide whether to join a cost-sharing alliance whose members share contribution costs equally while outsiders remain unconstrained. A strategy-vector method elicits conditional joining decisions at all possible positions in the sequence and contributions for all compatible alliance outcomes, allowing us to identify individual profiles across both margins and explore how their interplay enables such alliances to sustain and stabilize cooperation. Joining behavior is heterogeneous but structured: roughly a quarter of choices reflect unconditional joining, about 40

Suggested Citation

  • Andrej Angelovski & Irene Maria Buso & Daniela Di Cagno & Werner Gueth & Lorenzo Spadoni, 2026. "How Behavioral Heterogeneity Shapes Institution Formation and Cooperation: The Case of Cost-Sharing Alliances," Discussion Papers 2026/333, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  • Handle: RePEc:pie:dsedps:2026/333
    Note: ISSN 2039-1854
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    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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