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Innovation, Strategic Environmental Policy and North-South Trade: A Game Theoretic Analysis


  • Eslamloueyan, K.


This paper provides a framework to study how lobby-government interactions affect environmental R&D programs, government' green policies, firms' profitability, and environmental quality when a Northern country and a Southern country are engaged in trade. In our model, the motivation for an incumbent government to use environmental policy arises from its selfish desire to maximize its political support.

Suggested Citation

  • Eslamloueyan, K., 1998. "Innovation, Strategic Environmental Policy and North-South Trade: A Game Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 9802e, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ott:wpaper:9802e

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Lane, Daniel E., 1989. "Operational research and fisheries management," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 229-242, October.
    2. Pearse, Peter H. & Walters, Carl J., 1992. "Harvesting regulation under quota management systems for ocean fisheries : Decision making in the face of natural variability, weak information, risks and conflicting incentives," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 167-182, May.
    3. R. Quentin Grafton & Dale Squires & James E. Kirkley, 1996. "Private Property Rights And Crises In World Fisheries: Turning The Tide?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(4), pages 90-99, October.
    4. Parzival Copes, 1986. "A Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a Device in Fisheries Management," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 62(3), pages 278-291.
    5. Dupont, Diane P., 1990. "Rent dissipation in restricted access fisheries," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 26-44, July.
    6. Dupont, D.P., 1994. "Limited Entry Fishing Programs: Theory and Canadian Practice," Working Papers 1994-7, Brock University, Department of Economics.
    7. Paul C. Missios & Charles Plourde, 1996. "The Canada-European Union Turbot War: A Brief Game Theoretic Analysis," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 22(2), pages 144-150, June.
    8. Barston, Ronald, 1995. "United Nations Conference on straddling and highly migratory fish stocks," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 159-166, March.
    9. Grafton, R.Q. & squires, D. & Kirkley, J., 1995. "Turning the Tide? Private Property Rights and the Crisis of Fisheries Management," Working Papers 9505e, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
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    More about this item



    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy


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