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Finding Win-Win Policy in Platform-Price Regulation under Network Externalities, with an Application to Media

Author

Listed:
  • Yukihiro Nishimura

    (The University of Osaka and CESifo)

Abstract

This paper studies which side of a two-sided platform should be subject to price regulation when prices on the two sides are jointly determined. We develop a model in which a platform sets the price of a network good and a commission fee charged to participating firms. Cross-side network externalities determine both the platform’s unregulated price structure and the welfare effects of regulation. When the network-size externality is stronger than the app-variety externality, the platform charges a positive commission fee. A ceiling on this fee induces a waterbed effect: the platform raises the network-good price, reducing network-good consumer surplus. In contrast, a ceiling on the network-good price expands network participation and increases both network-good consumer surplus and developers’ producer surplus. When the relative strength of the externalities is reversed, the policy prescription can also reverse. Thus, the unregulated commission fee provides information about which side should be regulated to generate mutual gains. Numerical simulations show that the qualitative policy results are robust across nonlinear extensions, while the main pricing mechanism extends analytically to general demand and entry functions. We also apply the framework to media platforms, where advertising generates a negative cross-side externality.

Suggested Citation

  • Yukihiro Nishimura, 2025. "Finding Win-Win Policy in Platform-Price Regulation under Network Externalities, with an Application to Media," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 25-05-Rev., Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, revised Nov 2026.
  • Handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:2505r
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    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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