Kantian Equilibrium, Income Inequality, and Global Public

This paper develops a Kantian equilibrium framework, subsuming the global pollution model with private ownership, wherein agents condition their contributions on a universalizable moral imperative reflecting income and preference heterogeneity. After showing a specific proportionality assumption linking Kantian reasoning to other agents’ behavior that must make the Kantian equilibrium coincide with the Lindahl equilibrium, we show that the level of the public good increases with income inequality. Applying this framework to a global pollution model, we demonstrate that the Lindahl allocation in the global pollution model may fail to Pareto dominate the voluntary contribution (disagreement) equilibrium. In the global public good problem, we compare the Lindahl allocation with other proposed solutions, so we will discuss the nature of inter-country transfers and whether it Pareto dominates the disagreement equilibrium. Our analysis contributes to a re-interpretation of the morally grounded mechanisms for global public good provision, offering a bridge between normative ethics and economic design.