DAOs as Holacracies? Comparing Decentralized Governance Structures Through an Organizational Theory Lens

Purpose — Both Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) and Holacracies are positioned as alternatives to managerial hierarchy, yet they remain largely uncompared in the organizational theory literature. This paper asks: in what ways do DAOs and Holacracies converge and diverge as decentralized governance structures, and under what organizational conditions is each model more effective? Design/methodology/approach — This paper employs a conceptual comparative methodology, synthesizing organizational theory, open strategy scholarship and blockchain governance literature to map both structures across six governance dimensions: authority distribution, decision mechanism, membership and inclusion, accountability system, transparency and adaptability. Three theoretical propositions are developed. Findings — Although DAOs and Holacracies share a commitment to decentralized authority, they differ fundamentally in governance architecture. Holacracy achieves decentralization through formalized role-based consent governance; DAOs rely on algorithmic enforcement via smart contracts and token-weighted voting. These differences produce distinct failure modes — role ambiguity and cultural resistance in Holacracy; plutocratic concentration and voter apathy in DAOs. Practical implications — Organizations considering decentralized governance can use the typology developed here to match governance model to organizational context. High-formalization environments benefit from Holacracy's constitution-based approach; open, distributed communities may favor DAO architectures, provided token-concentration mechanisms are counteracted. Originality/value — This is the first paper to systematically compare Holacracy and DAO governance through an integrated organizational theory lens, connecting open strategy scholarship with blockchain governance research. Three falsifiable propositions and a governance typology are contributed.