Author
Listed:
- San Román del Pozuelo, Álvaro
Abstract
Can public goods expansion generate electoral backlash against incumbents? Do voters hold incumbents accountable for policies from which they derive no direct benefit? Conventional accountability models suggest that public goods provision rewards incumbents, yet the dynamics through which grievances translate into punishment remain both theoretically underdeveloped and empirically underexplored. This paper explores how infrastructure construction can provoke voter backlash in areas unaffected by new developments. Infrastructure provision has inherent characteristics that create particular scenarios for accountability. The visibility and salience of infrastructure, coupled with its differentiated, non-universal spatial impacts and slow expansion, set the stage for territorial competition across constituencies. When policymakers decide the location of new facilities, non-winners are confronted with a tangible counterfactual: the opportunity to enhance their own situation. The perception of having missed a chance to benefit—rather than material loss per se—is at the core of their grievance and becomes the main motivation to punish the incumbent responsible. Using a novel dataset on hospital construction in Spain (2002–2019) and municipality-level electoral results, I analyze how the allocation of 81 new hospitals affected support for regional incumbents. Compared with regions without hospital expansion, municipalities whose accessibility improved increased their support for the incumbent by 2.14 percentage points, whereas non-impacted municipalities reduced it by 1.85 points. Punishments manifest both as lower turnout (-2.26 pp) and as gains for opposition parties (+0.81 pp). Contrary to expectations, however, these punishments do not vary with prior accessibility. This study provides insights into nuanced electoral dynamics around public goods, emphasizing the critical role of unequal allocations in shaping electoral accountability.
Suggested Citation
San Román del Pozuelo, Álvaro, 2026.
"The Accountability of Missed Opportunities: Electoral punishments from public infrastructure expansion,"
SocArXiv
fuez5_v1, Center for Open Science.
Handle:
RePEc:osf:socarx:fuez5_v1
DOI: 10.31235/osf.io/fuez5_v1
Download full text from publisher
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:fuez5_v1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: OSF (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://socarxiv.org .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through
the various RePEc services.