Views on Democracy and Political Violence in the United States in 2025: Findings from a Nationally Representative Survey

Background: From 2022 to 2024, an annual, nationally representative, longitudinal survey in the United States (US) found high prevalences of support for and willingness to engage in political violence, with differences by party affiliation. The November 2024 US federal election replaced a Democratic administration with a Republican one, led by a president who has repeatedly endorsed use of force by the government against civilians. This study examines changes in support for and willingness to engage in political violence from mid-2024 to mid-2025. Methods: Survey participants were adult (age ≥ 18 years as of recruitment in 2022) members of Ipsos Knowledge Panel. Wave 4 was conducted May 23-June 13, 2025. The primary analysis generated findings for the cohort as a whole. In a secondary analysis, respondents were categorized by self-reported political party and Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement affiliations. Principal outcome measures comprised self-reported justification for political violence, personal willingness to engage in political violence, and expectation of firearm use in future political violence. Results for 2025 were presented as weighted prevalences with 95% confidence intervals (CIs). Change from 2024 to 2025 was estimated based on the means of aggregated individual change scores for each outcome measure. Results: The 2025 completion rate was 89.9% (8,248 respondents/9,179 invitees). For the cohort as a whole, there were only small increases from 2024 to 2025 in the prevalence of the belief that violence was usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 20 political objectives (2024: 32.3%, 95% CI 31.0%, 33.6%; 2025: 35.6%, 95% CI 34.1%, 37.0%) and to advance 16 of 20 specified objectives when these were assessed individually. There were no changes in the prevalence of high-level personal willingness to commit political violence or in expectation of firearm use in future political violence. Despite some increases in support for political violence from 2024 to 2025 among Democrats, MAGA Republicans in 2025 were substantially more likely than strong Democrats to consider violence usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 20 political objectives (MAGA Republicans 52.2%, 95% CI 48.4%, 56.1%; strong Democrats 32.1%, 95% CI 28.6%, 35.6%) and to advance 10 of those objectives when objectives were considered individually. MAGA Republicans and strong Democrats did not differ in 2025 in the percentages that were very or completely willing to commit political violence by level of severity or against any target population. A small group of non-Republican MAGA supporters had higher prevalences than most other groups on many measures. Conclusions: Support for and willingness to commit political violence increased only modestly from 2024 to 2025 and, where differences existed, remained generally higher among MAGA movement affiliates and Republicans than among Democrats. These findings can help focus prevention efforts.