When Perception Fails: Neurocognitive Factors in Police Use-of-Force Decisions

This paper proposes an integrative interdisciplinary framework to distinguish perceptual distortion from misconduct in legal evaluations of police culpability. The analysis examines how neurocognitive processes (brain-based cognitive functions) shape perception under high-stress conditions, particularly in police use-of-force incidents. Drawing on validated theories of predictive processing (the brain’s mechanism of anticipating sensory input based on prior experience) and evidence from perceptual neuroscience, the paper argues that some misconduct cases may involve genuine perceptual distortions (misinterpretations of sensory input caused by internal biases or stress-induced errors) rather than deliberate wrongdoing. It synthesizes research on the free-energy principle (a theory suggesting the brain reduces prediction error by either adjusting expectations or interpreting sensory input to fit those expectations), source monitoring theory (a model explaining how the brain identifies where a memory came from, and may confuse real sources or conflate internal and external origins), and emotional attention modulation (how emotional states influence what we notice, overlook, or prioritize in our environment) to explain how neurocognitive biases can produce vivid but erroneous threat perceptions. Rather than excusing harm, this approach aims to support more accurate allocation of responsibility between cognitive limitations and institutional failures in training, screening, and policy. The paper advocates for integrating neuroscientific insights into legal doctrine through reformed culpability standards that distinguish perceptual error from cognitive bias (systematic deviations from rational judgment caused by mental shortcuts or stress), while emphasizing accountability measures that reflect predictable human constraints.