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Interval values for strategic games in which players cooperate

  • Luisa Carpente

    (Universidade da Coruna)

  • Balbina Casas-Mendez

    (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela)

  • Ignacio Garcia-Jurado

    (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela)

  • Anne van den Nouweland


    (University of Oregon)

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    In this paper we propose a method to associate a coalitional interval game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower and upper values of finite two-person zero-sum games. We axiomatically characterize this new method. As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic characterizations of the upper value of finite two-person zero-sum games.

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    Paper provided by University of Oregon Economics Department in its series University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers with number 2005-16.

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    Length: 36
    Date of creation: 22 Sep 2005
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2005-16
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