Bargaining by Children
We study the development of bargaining behavior in children age seven through 18, using ultimatum and dictator games. We find that bargaining behavior changes substantially with age and that most of this change appears to be related to changes in preferences for fairness, rather than bargaining ability. Younger children make and accept smaller ultimatum proposals than do older children, Even young children are quite strategic in their behavior, making much smaller dictator than ultimatum proposals. Boys claim to be more aggressive bargainers than girls do, but they are not. Older girls make larger dictator proposals than older boys, but among younger children the proposals differ much more by height than by sex. We argue that the existence of systematic differences in bargaining behavior across age and sex supports the argument that culture is a determinant of economic behavior, and suggests that people acquire this culture during childhood. We argue that the height differences indicate that forces other than culture, in the usual sense of the word, are also important.
|Date of creation:||20 Jul 2002|
|Date of revision:||20 Jul 2002|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 1285 University of Oregon, 435 PLC, Eugene, OR 97403-1285|
Phone: (541) 346-8845
Fax: (541) 346-1243
Web page: http://economics.uoregon.edu/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2002-04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bill Harbaugh)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.