Wage Bargaining in an Optimal Control Framework: A Dynamic Version of the Right-to-Manage Model
This paper aims to represent wage bargaining as an optimal control problem. Specifically, by assuming that employment follows a stock adjustment principle towards the level that maximises profits, i.e., towards labour demand, we build an intertemporal optimising model in which the real wage is continuously set by an infinitely-lived omniscient arbitrator that is called in to resolve the dispute between the workers and the employers. Our theoretical proposal allows to show that unions may speed up the adjustment to equilibrium and it suggests that standard (static) models may understate the distortions implied by wage bargaining.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/about-the-faculty/departments/economics/research/discussion-papers.php
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:opn:wpaper:61. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (IT team member)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.