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Information sharing in competition policy

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  • OECD

Abstract

Competition rules governing information sharing must balance two primary risks: permissive rules may facilitate tacit collusion or explicit cartel conduct, while overly restrictive frameworks can chill legitimate collaboration and create market inefficiencies. This paper reviews how different forms of information exchange affect firm incentives and market outcomes, drawing on recent economic literature. It also examines how competition authorities across OECD jurisdictions have approached the issue in practice, including through enforcement, case law and guidance. The paper aims to clarify the main factors that shape competitive risk and how those factors are reflected in current assessment and enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Oecd, 2026. "Information sharing in competition policy," OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers 335, OECD Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:oec:dafaac:335-en
    DOI: 10.1787/ecbf13e9-en
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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