Global South Agency: From Victimhood to Systemic Architecture

For much of the post-war period, the Global South was framed as an object of history, defined by dependency, constrained by structural asymmetries, and confined to the margins of global decision-making. That narrative, once empirically grounded, is now no longer adequate. A profound yet uneven transformation is underway. The Global South is no longer only reacting; it is increasingly shaping rules, institutions, and narratives. This Policy Brief argues that the Global South is thus transitioning from victimhood to agency, and potentially from agency toward systemic authorship. However, authorship remains an aspiration, not an achievement. The transition is real but contested, reversible in parts, and complicated by deep internal divisions. To move beyond intuitive claims, the brief proposes a novel operational tool, the Global South Agency Index (GSAI). This would be a composite annual measure of Southern influence over binding international rules. Central to this transformation is China, not as a new hegemon, but as a catalytic anchor with scale and strategic coherence that has expanded the room for maneuver for other Global-South actors. Yet China’s rise also introduces new asymmetries and rivalries. This Policy Brief advances three propositions. First, Global-South agency must be understood as the capacity to shape rules, not merely to participate. Second, this agency is real but fragmented, constrained by intra-Global South tensions (India-China, middle powers vs Least-Developed Countries, regional rivalries). Third, moving from agency to durable systemic architecture requires these internal divisions to be confronted, and strategic coherence to be built. The emerging order is not a simple power transition but a normative pluralization. The Global South’s growing influence has not yet translated into authorship of binding international rules. Whether it can do so depends on its ability to manage internal contradictions, and to convert episodic coordination into lasting institutions. I am deeply grateful to Hu Fengning, my former student at China Foreign Affairs University, for his invaluable help with this policy brief – from tracking down sources to sharpening the argument. His contribution made this work better. All shortcomings remain mine.