Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly
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- Vincent, Daniel R., 1989. "Bargaining with common values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 47-62, June.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Raymond J. Deneckere, 1988. "Efficient Sequential Bargaining," Discussion Papers 804, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Raymond J. Deneckere, 1987. "A Direct Mechanism Characterization of Sequential Bargaining With One-Sided Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 728, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Lawrence Ausubel & Raymond Deneckere, 1985. "One is Almost Enough for Monopoly," Discussion Papers 669, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- David Butz, 1988. "Durable Good Monopoly and Best-Price Provisions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 472, UCLA Department of Economics.
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