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Empresa Familiar, Mecanismos de Gobierno y Discrecionalidad Directiva

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Abstract

El presente trabajo analiza la interacci¢n entre los mecanismos de gobierno de la empresa ?estructura de propiedad, consejo de administraci¢n y deuda-, centr ndonos especialmente en el estudio de la estructura de propiedad, en concreto, el control familiar, como mecanismo de supervisi¢n y control de la direcci¢n. Tras comprobar que la propiedad familiar constituye un elemento disciplinador del equipo directivo, se analiza el efecto de los mecanismos de gobierno sobre la discrecionalidad directiva segmentando la muestra por estructura de propiedad ?familiares y no familiares-, obteniendo que mecanismos de control que resultaban relevantes dejan de serlo debido a que uno de los mecanismos, concretamente la estructura de propiedad familiar, alivia los problemas de agencia evitando el incurrir en mecanismos de control adicionales como la deuda. Como variable representativa de la discrecionalidad directiva hemos tomado los ajustes por devengo discrecionales obtenidos de la aplicaci¢n del Modelo de Jones es su versi¢n de corte transversal.

Suggested Citation

  • Castrillo Lara, Luis & San Mart¡n Reyna, Juan Manuel, 2006. "Empresa Familiar, Mecanismos de Gobierno y Discrecionalidad Directiva," Working Papers "New Trends on Business Administration". Documentos de Trabajo "Nuevas Tendencias en Dirección de Empresas". 2006-12, Interuniversity Research Master and Doctorate Program (with a quality mention of ANECA) on "Business Economics", Universities of Valladolid, Burgos, Salamanca and León (Spain). Until 2008, Interuniversity Doctorate Program (with a quality mention of ANECA) “New trends in Business Administration”, Universities of Valladolid, Burgos, and Salamanca (Spain). Master en Investigación y Programa de Docto.
  • Handle: RePEc:ntd:wpaper:2006-12
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    Keywords

    Mecanismos de gobierno; discrecionalidad; ajustes por devengo; empresa familiar.;

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