Price discrimination and targeted advertising: a welfare analysis
We present a monopolistic model of price discrimination by means of targeted informative advertising. Targeting is defined as the ability of the monopolistic to direct messages with differentiated contents to groups of buyers with different valuations for the good. We show that only if targeting is perfect will the monopolistic behave in a socially desirable way.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +351 253601930
Fax: +351 253601380
Web page: http://nima.eeg.uminho.pt/
|Order Information:|| Postal: NIMA, EEG - Universidade do Minho, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal|
Web: http://nima.eeg.uminho.pt/ Email:
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nim:nimawp:4/2000. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (NIMA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.