Bargaining behavior, demographics and nationality: a reconsideration of the experimental evidence
Bargaining behavior appears to vary across nations. What drives these apparent differences? We reconsider the evidence provided by previous experiments, and undertake some new experiments that expand the controls for demographics. We show that inferences about country effects are sensitive to the way in which the data are analyzed and the controls that are incorporated. Separating out differences in initial behavior versus trend shows significant differences in both. Adding interaction effects between countries, gender, and ethnic background shows that cultural differences are more complex than the factors captured by either nationality or gender alone. Some subgroups behave in ways which are clearly closer to the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction than others.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2001|
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