IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nig/wpaper/0141.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Manipulating an ordering

Author

Listed:
  • Conal Duddy
  • Juan Perote-Pena
  • Asjley Piggins

    (Department of Economics, National University of Ireland, Galway)

Abstract

It is well known that many social decision procedures are manipulable through strategic behaviour. Typically, the decision procedures considered in the literature are social choice correspondences. In this paper we investigate the problem of constructing a social welfare function that is non-manipulable. In this context, individuals attempt to manipulate a social ordering as opposed to a social choice. Using techniques from an ordinal version of fuzzy set theory, we introduce a class of ordinally fuzzy binary relations of which exact binary relations are a special case. Operating within this family enables us to prove an impossibility theorem. This theorem states that all non-manipulable social welfare functions are dictatorial, provided that they are not constant. This theorem generalizes the one in Perote-Pena and Piggins (Perote-Pena, J., Piggins, A., 2007. Strategy-proof fuzzy aggregation rules. J. Math. Econ., vol. 43, p. 564 - p. 580). We conclude by considering several ways of circumventing this impossibility theorem.

Suggested Citation

  • Conal Duddy & Juan Perote-Pena & Asjley Piggins, 2009. "Manipulating an ordering," Working Papers 0141, National University of Ireland Galway, Department of Economics, revised 2009.
  • Handle: RePEc:nig:wpaper:0141
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.economics.nuig.ie/resrch/paper.php?pid=148
    File Function: First version, 2009
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.economics.nuig.ie/resrch/paper.php?pid=148
    File Function: Revised version, 2009
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ján Palguta, 2011. "Voting Experiments: Measuring Vulnerability of Voting Procedures to Manipulation," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 324-345, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ordinal fuzziness; social welfare function; manipulation Algorithmic Trading; MACD;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nig:wpaper:0141. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Srinivas Raghavendra). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/deucgie.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.