Committee Structure and the Success of Connected Lending in Nineteenth Century New England Banks
Early nineteenth century New England banking exhibited high levels of lending to directors and their associates (i.e., connected lending). Today many think this arrangement can lead to inefficiency and financial fragility. This paper explores the decision making processes inside these banks and argues that connected lending was viable when many people were involved in loan decisions. The committees used to vote on the approval of loans are the focus. Banks that required more votes for a given committee size prevented the approval of loans with private gains and social costs. The historical data are consistent with the idea that higher levels of consensus in the loan committees raised the return on assets.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Meissner, Christopher M. "Voting Rules And The Success Of Connected Lending In 19th Century New England Banks," Explorations in Economic History, 2005, v42(4,Oct), 509-528.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9792. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.