The Efficiency of the Legal System versus the Income Tax in Redistributing Income
Should legal rules be chosen only on the basis of their efficiency or also on the basis of their distributional effects? This article demonstrates that redistribution accomplished through legal rules is systematically less efficient than redistribution accomplished through the income tax system -- even though the latter distorts incentives to work. In particular. a regime with an inefficient legal rule can be replaced by a regime with an efficient legal rule and a modified income tax system designed so that every person is made better off.
|Date of creation:||Sep 1993|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. XXIII, no. 2, pp. 667-681, (June 1994).|
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