IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/35913.html

Inside Central Bankers’ Calendars: How Do Fed Chairs Allocate Their Time?

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas Drechsel
  • Dali Tsakadze

Abstract

How leaders allocate their limited time and attention is an important question in economics. This paper constructs and analyzes a novel data set covering the daily calendars of three Federal Reserve Chairs, Ben Bernanke, Janet Yellen, and Jerome Powell, containing more than 20,000 calendar entries. We document several patterns. First, all Fed Chairs spend more than 30% of their documented meetings with Fed staff, highlighting the crucial role of economists in the Fed's decision process. Second, interactions with the media became more frequent during Bernanke's tenure and remained important until the end of Powell's tenure. Third, Powell held significantly more meetings with lawmakers than both Yellen and Bernanke, reflecting an increasing need for the Fed to engage with political actors. Beyond these trend patterns, we examine the time allocation of Fed Chairs at business cycle frequencies and show how different activities respond to shifts in the macroeconomic environment. Finally, we place our findings in historical context using the available calendars of earlier Fed Chairs, including Alan Greenspan.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Drechsel & Dali Tsakadze, 2026. "Inside Central Bankers’ Calendars: How Do Fed Chairs Allocate Their Time?," NBER Working Papers 35913, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35913
    Note: ME
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w35913.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html. Free access is also available to older working papers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35913. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.