Strategic Complementarity and Persistence in Linear-Quadratic Mean Field Games

We study the relation between strategic complementarities and aggregate persistence in linear-quadratic mean field games with interactions in states and actions. The framework provides local approximations to common macroeconomic problems, including capital accumulation and multiproduct pricing. We show that the equilibrium aggregate dynamics coincide with those of a single-agent linear-quadratic control problem in which state and action curvatures are adjusted for strategic interactions. This result gives conditions for equilibrium existence, establishes uniqueness, and links strategic interactions to aggregate adjustment. We establish conditions under which stronger state complementarities increase persistence, while stronger action complementarities reduce it, even in multidimensional problems whose underlying matrices are not simultaneously diagonalizable. Under these conditions, internalizing state complementarities makes the utilitarian planner’s allocation more persistent, while internalizing action complementarities makes it less persistent. Aggregate-only payoff terms can reinforce or offset these effects. With common shocks, we give conditions under which individual and aggregate dynamics can be combined to identify strategic interactions and model parameters. Finally, we extend the analysis to interactions through higher moments of the state distribution.