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Staged Access and Liability for Dual-Use Artificial Intelligence

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  • Joshua S. Gans

Abstract

How should regulators combine staged access to a dual-use AI model with developer liability? I model a defender and an adversary searching for the same software flaws. After release, liability induces more defensive search but also makes the adversary search harder, limiting its effect on harm. Exclusive access removes this strategic response, so staged access and liability are complements in protection. Defensive effort rises towards the release date, making additional delay progressively less productive. Optimal evaluation windows are therefore bounded, and their response to greater harm saturates. Because defensive search uses real resources, the efficient liability rate can be below full internalisation of harm. That rate generally cannot induce the developer to choose the regulator's preferred release date, leaving a distinct role for a timing mandate.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua S. Gans, 2026. "Staged Access and Liability for Dual-Use Artificial Intelligence," NBER Working Papers 35586, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35586
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes

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