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Financial Incentives, Health Screening, and Selection into Mental Health Care: Experimental Evidence from College Students in India

Author

Listed:
  • Emily Breza
  • Kevin Carney
  • Vijaya Raghavan
  • Kailash Rajah
  • Thara Rangaswamy
  • Gautam Rao
  • Frank Schilbach
  • Sobia Shadbar
  • James Stratton

Abstract

In an RCT with college students in Chennai (N=340), we test how modest financial incentives and personalized feedback affect the uptake and targeting (by symptom severity) of free therapy. Despite 56% of students screening positive for at least mild depression or anxiety, only 3% in the control group took up therapy. A small cash incentive increased appointments by 9 percentage points (p = 0.06) on average without substantially affecting targeting. Personalized feedback and recommendations based on a mental health screening tool significantly improved targeting while keeping overall take-up largely unchanged. Combining these two treatments achieved both higher take-up and improved targeting, by increasing appointments among symptomatic individuals by 21 pp (p

Suggested Citation

  • Emily Breza & Kevin Carney & Vijaya Raghavan & Kailash Rajah & Thara Rangaswamy & Gautam Rao & Frank Schilbach & Sobia Shadbar & James Stratton, 2026. "Financial Incentives, Health Screening, and Selection into Mental Health Care: Experimental Evidence from College Students in India," NBER Working Papers 34819, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34819
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General

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