IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/32399.html

A Computable Dynamic Oligopoly Model of Capacity Investment

Author

Listed:
  • Gautam Gowrisankaran
  • Philipp Schmidt-Dengler

Abstract

We consider widely used dynamic models where every period, each agent receives a private information shock to investment marginal cost and chooses among many ordered investment levels. We provide a computationally fast method to calculate optimal investment probabilities given value functions. Our method finds shock cutoffs between investment choices, accounting for the possibility that some levels are dominated. Other methods to compute these models may result in non-existence of pure strategy equilibrium or only work under restrictive assumptions. Multinomial logit models with choice-specific shocks can lead to counterintuitive predictions. Our method is useful to researchers estimating dynamic models of investment.

Suggested Citation

  • Gautam Gowrisankaran & Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, 2024. "A Computable Dynamic Oligopoly Model of Capacity Investment," NBER Working Papers 32399, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32399
    Note: IO
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w32399.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Takeshi Fukasawa & Hiroshi Ohashi, 2025. "Investment Dynamics and Merger Policy: Long-run Effects of Horizontal Merger in Oligopolistic Market," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1264, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C57 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Econometrics of Games and Auctions

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32399. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.