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Tax Aversion and the Social Contract in Africa

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  • James A. Robinson

Abstract

Despite the low levels of taxation and public good provision in Africa, I provide evidence that a large proportion of Africans prefer lower taxation and fewer public goods. This cannot be explained by standard arguments about problems of accountability, governance or state capacity. Instead I argue that it reflects deeply seated ideas about the nature of the state and its potential threats to the autonomy of society. I show the historic social contracts in Africa rarely featured taxation and kept the state to limited jurisdictions. These social contracts have in many ways reproduced themselves and influence the way Africa is governed today.

Suggested Citation

  • James A. Robinson, 2022. "Tax Aversion and the Social Contract in Africa," NBER Working Papers 29924, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29924
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    Cited by:

    1. Samuel Bazzi & Masyhur Hilmy & Benjamin Marx, 2020. "Religion, Education, and Development," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03873758, HAL.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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