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Torts in Which Victim and Injurer Act Sequentially

Listed author(s):
  • Steven Shavell

The effect of liability rules on accident avoidance is studied in two types of situations in which potential victims and potential injurers act sequentially: those where victims act first and injurers second; and those where the reverse is true. What is of special interest about the working of liability rules in such sequential situations is that the party who acts second behaves in response to the party who acts first, and that the party who acts first takes this into account. The major result shown is that liability rules induce optimal behavior provided that they lead the party who acts second to act optimally if and only if the first party did so. In an important extension of the basic model considered, however, this result may not hold.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 0939.

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Date of creation: Jul 1982
Publication status: published as Shavell, Steven. "Torts in Which Victim and Injurer Act Sequentially." Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, (October 1983), pp. 589-612.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:0939
Note: LE
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