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Job Rationing With Complete Contracts: An Informed- Principal Approach

Author

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  • BEAUDRY, P.

Abstract

Dans Cette Etude, le Rationnement de L'emploi Est Explique a L'aide D'une Modification a la Theorie de L'agence Ou L'employeur Possede de L'information Asymmetrique. au Moment de L'embauche, Si un Employeur a Suffisamment D'information Privilegiee Sur la Valeur de L'effort du Travailleur, Alors le Contrat Optimal Prescrit a L'employeur De+ Transmettre des Rentes a L'agent. Ces Rentes Sont Versees Pour Signaler au Travailleur Que Ses Efforts Seront Vraisemblablement Remuneres Dans le Futur. le Resultat Sur le Rationnement de L'emploi Decoule Exclusivement de L'interaction Entre le Probleme de Risque Moral et le Probleme de Selection Adverse, et Ne Depend Aucunement de Contrainte Su les Possibilites Contractuelles.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Beaudry, P., 1989. "Job Rationing With Complete Contracts: An Informed- Principal Approach," Cahiers de recherche 8906, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:8906
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