Author
Abstract
Debates on the taxation of financial transactions (FTT) are longstanding and primarily focus on its effects on markets and the economy. In practice, however, the FTT is less of a regulatory tool and more of a fiscal instrument. This article examines the FTT from this perspective. Our contribution specifically aims to address two questions generally overlooked in previous studies: who pays the FTT and how? Our analysis focuses mainly on the FTT in force in France (FTT-F). In practice, the FTT-F is not a tax on transactions, but only on transfers OF SHARES that are recorded on a daily basis. A large portion of transactions is excluded from the scheme, which significantly reduces the tax base. It is estimated that the transactions actually taxed represent, in the end, only 15% of the total. The incidence of the FTT primarily impacts financial intermediaries, for whom the reduction in trades represents a loss of income, while individuals bear a minimal cost. Additionally, approximately half of the tax is collected from abroard, and the FTT-F has a strong redistributive aspect. The collection of the FTT-F is not carried out by the public administration but is delegated to Euroclear France, a private company subsidiary of an international group. We propose that the collection should instead be directly handled by the General Directorate of Public Finances (DGFiP), with the support of the Fiancial Markets Authority (AMF), which has the necessary data; there are real synergies between its activity of monitoring stock market transactions and the collection of the FTT-F. This, of course, implies that the human and financial resources of the AMF are increased accordingly. Changing the collection system would improve controls, broaden the tax base, and significantly increase tax revenues, while enhancing transparency and equity
Suggested Citation
Gunther Capelle-Blancard, 2024.
"La taxation des transactions financières : une analyse du dispositif français,"
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
24008, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
Handle:
RePEc:mse:cesdoc:24008
Download full text from publisher
More about this item
Keywords
;
;
;
JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following
NEP Reports:
Statistics
Access and download statistics
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:24008. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lucie Label (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cenp1fr.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through
the various RePEc services.