Seperable Voting Rules and the Strong Referandum Paradox
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KeywordsVoting Paradox; Referandum Paradox; Representive Democracy; Gerrymandering;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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