Golden-rule social security and public health in a dynastic model with endogenous longevity and fertility
In this paper we investigate long-run optimal social security and public health and their effects on fertility, longevity, capital intensity, output per worker and welfare in a dynastic model with altruistic bequests. Under empirically plausible conditions, social security and public health reduce fertility and raise longevity, capital intensity and output per worker. The effects of social security, except that on longevity, are stronger than those of public health. Numerically, they can improve welfare (better when they are used together than used separately). We also illustrate numerically that there exists a unique convergent solution in the dynamic system at the steady state.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, Monash University, Victoria 3800, Australia|
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