Signaling and the Design of Delegated Management for Public Utilities
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- David Martimort, 2006. "An Agency Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Privatization," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 5-44, July.
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KeywordsINFORMED PRINCIPAL ; SIGNALING GAMES ; INCENTIVES ; DELEGATION;
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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